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A pragmatic approach to causality
Since Pearl’s seminal work on providing a formal language for causality, the subject has garnered a
lot of interest among philosophers and researchers in artifical intelligence alike. One of the most debated
topics in this context regards the notion of actual causation, or token causation, which concerns itself
with specific - as opposed to general - causal claims. The search for a proper formal definition of actual
causation has evolved into a controversial debate, that is pervaded with ambiguities and confusion. The
standard procedure to defend one’s definition is to go over certain pivotal examples and argue that the
proposed definition matches up with basic intuitions regarding these. If, however, one is confronted with
an example that gives rise to stubborn counterintuitive answers, the strategy is to argue that the usual way
of portraying the example is misleading, and that when modelled properly - i.e., using one’s own formal
resources - these counterintuitions disappear.
There are thus two major obstacles that hinder significant advances in this debate. First, the different
parties make use of different formal languages (or lack a formal language altogether), making it hard to
compare their definitions. Second, each of the conflicting intuitions that give rise to disagreement strikes
a chord in one or other example, so we cannot dismiss any of them as completely inappropriate. We
aim to remove the first of these obstacles by introducing a formal paradigm that is expressive enough
to accomodate the main existing approaches. Second, we will shift focus from a general and abstract
discussion of causation towards an instrumental view, i.e., towards applications of causal reasoning. By
doing so, it will become clear that the different and conflicting intuitions often stem from different types
of applications which justify them. It is important to note that here we do not take a position concerning
actual causation, but rather provide a general framework in which different positions can both be expressed
and motivated.
Our formal paradigm, CP-logic (Causal Probabilistic-logic), uses a Prolog-like syntax in combination
with a more refined and expressive semantics. A CP-theory consist of CP-laws, which are modular, non-
deterministic causal laws between propositional conditions and possible atomic effects. CP-logic has an
explicitly dynamic semantics. This means that probability trees are used to represent the unfolding of
events according to a CP-theory, in which initially by default all atoms are false and only become true
when caused. A probability tree defined by a CP-theory T determines a probability distribution PT over all
variables. Each branch of such a tree corresponds to a particular chain of events, i.e., a story S, meaning one
particular way of how the causal domain might unfold from an initial state - described by a truth assignment
to a set of exogenous variables - into an end state.
Assume we are looking at a causal domain that is described by a causal theory T . Our goal is to
distinguish between different situations in which (variants of) the following question arises: “Given that
we desire outcome E, should we perform action C or not?”. This instrumental question is far more clear
than its causal counterpart: “Is C a cause of E?”. To answer it we need to verify the following inequality,
where T ′ is a CP-theory constructed out of T , e is the available evidence regarding exogenous variables,
and the do() operator is borrowed from Pearl to indicate an intervention:
PT ′(E|do(C),e)> PT ′(E|do(¬C),e)
The crux of the matter lies in the fact that to different situations correspond different ways of construct-
ing T ′ out of T . The interesting situations - i.e., those that are related to actual cauation - arise when we
have already observed a particular story S in which eventsC and E took place, because then the given ques-
tion comes down to: “Given that we desire outcome E again, should we perform action C again or not?”.
Obviously the answer depends on the similarity between the story S′ that can take place according to T ′ and
the already observed story S. Therefore we shall delineate the different situations we wish to consider by
looking at the different ways in which these stories may be similar. S provides three types of information: it
contains evidence concerning the exogenous variables, it tells us which laws happened and in which order,
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and for those laws that happened it tells us which possible effects of those laws became actualised. Except
for situations of general causation, the first type of information will always be transferred to S′.
The second and third types of information, however, each give rise to three options concerning the
similarity between S′ and S. Therefore, combining the different levels of similarity between S and S′ from
the second and third type of information gives nine options of constructing T ′ out of T , where some of these
options can be partitioned even further. Although some of these options will turn out not to correspond to
meaningful practical situation, many of them do describe concrete situations. More importantly, we believe
that many examples in the literature on actual causation rely on intuitions that are based on these situations.
In the full paper we will therefore give an in-depth description of each situation and investigate its relation
to examples and intuitions concerning actual causation. Now it may very well be that the concept of
actual causation is diverse enough to encompass several of these situations rather than just one of them, but
nonetheless it is worthwhile to partition the causal spectrum in this manner to disambiguate the discussion
and to provide a frame of reference. Furthermore, from a pragmatic perspective we simply need to find
out which situation is applicable in a given context, and the whole matter of there genuinely being actual
causation or not can be set aside.
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